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International Human Resource Strategy and Control:
The Case of Multinationals and Their Subsidiaries
ABSTRACT
This study examined the relationship between International Human ResourCe (IHR) Strategy and
International Human Resource Control. To do so, Jarillo and Martinez's (1990) framework for
parent--subsidiary business strategy was recast into an llIR strategy context and Snell's (1992)
conceptualization of control in the supervisor--subordinate relationship was extended to the
parent--subsidiary setting. Data from 100 subsidiaries and their parents showed that subsidiaries
adopt one of three (receptive, active, or autonomous) IHR strategies. In addition, the data
demonstrate that a globally integrated IHR strategy is associated with tighter control over the
subsidiary's selection, performance evaluation, and reward systems and looser control over the
subsidiary's training and socialization system when contrasted with a more locally responsive IHR
strategy.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The past decade has seen an increasing interest in "International Human Resource
Strategy" as one of the newest subfields of Human Resource Management (pucik, 1984; Doz and
Prahalad, 1986; Adler and Ghadar, 1989; Milliman and Von Glinow, 1991). Oflate, one stream
in this research domain has even begun to explore the link between international human resource
(lliR) strategy and overall corporate strategy. To date, however, this research has tended to be
conceptual, focusing nearly exclusively on overall corporate strategy, IHR strategy, or the·
intersection of the two. The relationship between IHR strategy (the decision to standardize or
localize) and IHR control systems (those policies and practices adopted to govern a subsidiary)
has been neglected. To address this gap, we define, measure, and then analyze the relationship
between IHR strategy and lliR control.
At present, a framework to analyze the IHR strategy--IHR control relationship does not
~ - .. - - - . .
exist. This is the case, even though some argue that multinationals should be thought of as
internally differentiated interorganizational networks (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990). Indeed, some
even assert that the MNC's headquarters and its collection of national subsidiaries comprise a
network of geographically disperse and goal disparate organizations. Moreover, there are those
who say that such an interorganizational networkr~sideswithin a larger external network made
up of other stakeholder groups (including customers, suppliers, and regulators) with whom the
multinational and its subsidiaries must interact.
Accordingly, there are many who suggest that when it comes to managing their human
resources, MNCs need to balance consistency and standardization against the need to adapt to the
varied cultures and countries in which they are operating (Adler, 1986; Laurent, 1986; Schneider,
1988; Sheth and Eshgi, 1989). In fact, nearly half of the MNCs surveyed by Dowling (1989)
reported that they use different HRM approaches from subsidiary to subsidiary. Considering
findings like this, the need for a framework to categorize different HR strategies at the subsidiary
level is readily evident.
-!,..... '.
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Since every country presents its own unique strategic opportunities and threats for MNCs,
a parent company must, therefore, tailor its control to match the diverse conditions that a MNC
faces in the various regions and nations in which it opera~s. Thus, it does not seem tenable to
suggest that it is appropriate to base strategic control around the globe upon a single set of
centrally issued policies. Instead, it appears thafit is imperative for the MNC to be sensitive to
local issues while at the same time insuring that there is some degree of integration across
countries and operations (Doz and Prahalad, 1986). In light of this, the fundamental challenge
that confronts us is to fIrst examine the tradeoffs multinationals face when deciding between
globally integrated (standardized) and locally responsive (customized) HR strategies and then to
answer the question, "how do these strategies affect the level of control that the parent has over
the human resources of its subsidiary?"
To accomplish this, this paper begins bY,developing a global integration--Iocal
responsiveness framework to categorize IHR strategies at the subsidiary level. Then we defIne
and investigate IHR control from a strategic perspective. Finally, using a sample of companies
who have subsidiaries operating in Taiwan, we test a set of hypotheses that address the
relationship between IHR strategy and IHR controL
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCE STRATEGY.
The Global Integration and Local Responsiveness Framework
The dominant lens for examining fIrms and strategies operating in an international context
has been the global integration--Iocal responsiveness, or JR, framework. Some of its different
renderings appear in Table 1 below. In shon, managerial perceptions of the environment vary
along two basic imperatives, pressures for global integration and pressures for local
responsiveness. These two dimensions defme this categorization scheme. For example, for any
given business, pressures for global integration are driven by industry forces that necessitate
worldwide business resource deployments for strategic pursuits. Accordingly, strategic decisions
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take into account the need to maximize the efficiencies of the collective organization to integrate
activities across national boundaries. In contrast, local responsiveness pressures are industry
forces that necessitate local, context-sensitive strategic decisions. Responding to local pressures,
management must respond predominantly to each local market or industry setting irrespective of
the strategic consideration of sister business units (Prahalad and Doz, 1987).
****************************
Put Table 1 here
****************************
Heenan and Perlmutter (1979) used four terms to describe MNC firms. The four types
they defined are ethnocentric, an approach that features uniformity; polycentric, a perspective that
allows for autonomy; geocentric, a viewpoint that facilitates the blending of standardization and
customization; and regiocentric, an approach that is smaller than a worldwide focus but bigger .
than a nation. Evans (1986) states that each of these approaches represents a different way of
coping with the different sociocultural environments a MNC confronts. There are those who say
that when it is possible to distinctly and independently define divisions and business, firms should
adopt "polycentric human resource strategies." On the other hand, it has been argued that firms in
worldwide industries where divisions and subsidiaries are interdependent ought to adopt"global
human resource strategies."
As for linking global human resource strategies and these different types of finns,
Schneider (1988) suggests that it is necessary to take care when establishing global practicesso
that "geocentric" firms look different from "ethnocentric" ones, while remaining sensitive to needs
for differentiation at the same time. Indeed, it is easy to see how this schema designed for
classifyingjinns can be used to categorize different IHR strategies, too (see Figure 1). For
example, a MNC may adopt an ethnocentric HR strategy which creates a global integration
benefit, but provides little, if any, benefit on the local respOnsiveness dimension. Alternatively, a
polycentric strategy will provide the MNC with a high benefit on the local responsiveness
dimension, but a low one on the global integration· dimension. Finally, a MNC may embrace a
• 'r~';:: .~
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responding to each pressure (Ghoshal, 1987). These pressures may be present across the overall
capital, product and labor markets, at the industry level, at the individual business unit level, or
even at a functional or task level within a business unit. Therefore, this framework can also be
useful for modeling the two pressures that drive IHR strategy. To formulate IHR strategy, we
need to ask: Should HRM necessarily be localized, or culture-bound? On the other hand, we need
to probe whether a MNC can derive a competitive advantage associated with applying a
globalized approach to HRM.
According to Adler (1986), a homogenized approach to HRM weakens a MNC's
competitive advantage because it ignores.or trivializes culture differences rather than taking
advantage of them. As Laurent (1986) has noted, in order to build, maintain and develop their
corporate identities, MNCs need to strive for consistency in their ways of managing people on a
worldwide basis. At the same time, to be effective locally, they also need to adapt their ways to
- - _. - -_."_0 ._ .. '_ .. __ •__. . _ _ .
the specific cultural requirements of different societies. While the global nature of the business
may call for increased consisten,cy, the variety of cultural environments may be calling for
differentiation. Thus, consistency and differentiation may seem to capture the fundamental
dimensions of lliR strategy.
Jarillo and Martinez (1990), based on their empirical study of 50 Spanish subsidiaries of
MNCs, offer yet another integration--responsiveness categorization scheme. For any subsidiary
of an MNC operating in a given country, they posit that the subsidiary follows: an "autonomous"
strategy if it carries out most of the functions on the value chain in a manner that is independent
of its parent organization or other subsidiaries; a "receptive" strategy if these functions are highly
integrated with those of the rest of the fIrm; and finally, an "active" strategy if the functions
originate within the country but are carried out in close coordination with headquarters and other
subsidiaries--thus serving as one of many active nodes in a tightly knit network (see Figure 3).
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geocentric strategy for a high benefit on both the local responsiveness and global integration
dimensions.
****************************
Put Figure 1 here
****************************
Along with Heenan and Perlmutter (1979), Bartlett and Ghoshal (1987) have also
developed a categorization scheme at the finn level. Rather than focusing on the fInn's levels of
independence and interdependence, they focus on the notions of global integration and national
responsiveness to arrive at their global, multinational, and transnational designations. Likewise,
Porter (1986) casts the integration/responsiveness dimensions in tenns of "coordination
configuration of activities" to arrive at a similarscheme classifying different corporate strategies.
A Framework for HR Strategy at the Subsidiary Level
Sheth and Eshgi (1989) were among the fIrst to develop a framework exclusively for
classifying different IHR strategies according to their levels of consistency (globalization) and
localization (responsiveness). As can be seen in Figure 2, they label the two strategic dimensions,
consistency and localization, and argue that when neither is appropriate a "decentralized" IHR
strategy is sufficient. For example, they suggest that export driven companies often act in this
manner. Of course, this is likely to be less and less true as organizations gain experience
expanding the scope of their business operations. In addition to this, they identify three other
strategic approaches (an "ad hoc", country by country HR strategy; a "worldwide", best of both
worlds HR strategy; and an "umbrella", or all encompassing HR strategy) that multinationals and
their subsidiaries may adopt
****************************
Put Figure 2 here
****************************
It is also possible to use the global integration--Iocal responsiveness framework to
ascertain the relative strength of these two pressures by considering the costs and benefIts of
.' ''''.-/. "
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****************************
Put Figure 3 here
****************************
In general, the autonomous HR. strategy will be typical of subsidiaries of polycentric finns;
the receptive HR strategy will be typical of subsidiaries of ethnocentric finns; and finally,
subsidiaries of geocentric finns will adhere to an active HR strategy. It is important, however, to
note that in some cases a MNC may use a combination of approaches, depending on the region or
country in which it is operating. As Dowling (1989) reported, a MNC may operate its European
interest in a geocentric manner and itsSoutheast Asian interests in an ethnocentric way.
Another approach is that of Milliman and Von Glinow (1991) who propose that the
concepts of external organizational fit (across cultures or countries) and internal organizational fit
(across levels or units) are useful for classifying subsidiaries' HR strategies. The internal--outside
---_._---_._--_.-~----,_._---- _._-~._--.--._-_. _.. .... - .- -- - .~. --~- - --_.-._---_. ~-'-'-----_._---'-'----------_._-
organizational fit specifies the fit between the IHR functions of the foreign subsidiary and the IHR.
functions at the corporate level. The external--outside organizational fit involves the degree of fit
between the IHR function and the cross-national and cross-cultural environment at both the
corporate and subsidiary levels. In other words, subsidiaries need to take into account the degree
of integration within the corporation (internal fit).and the degree oflocalization within the nation
or environment (external fit) for their IHR. strategies. Therefore, based on the concepts of IR and
fit, we can apply Jarillo and Martinez framework (1990) to categorize the different types ofHR
strategies at subsidiary level.
In this study, we blend the JariHo and Martinez (1990) approach, which emphasizes the
receptive, autonomous, and active notions, with the Milliman and Von Glinow (1991) approach,
which emphasizes the role of lliR strategy, to develop a new IHR. strategy classification scheme
(see Figure 4).
****************************
Put Figure 4 here
****************************
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Under this scheme, a subsidiary of an MNC in a given country is adopting: an
"autonomous HR strategy" if it is benefiting from a low degree of integration and high degree of
localization; a "receptive HR strategy" if it is benefiting from a high degree of integration and low
degree of localization; and an "active HR strategy" if it is benefiting from high degree of
integration and high degree of localization. Accordingly, the first hypothesis for this study is as
follows.
Hypotheses 1: IHR strategies ofMNCs' subsidiaries will be segmented by subgroups
according to degrees ofintegration and localization. These subgroups will resemble
Jarillo and Martinez's three types: autonomous strategy, receptive strategy, and active strategy.
- -
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CONTROL
_- -_:TJIDP~!lJ)auI11_U9Q~th~~J:t~ftI!~ cont!:.qt~s, "~y P!"Of~~s_!hat=h;!~~ <ilig~Jh<?..:~ct!Q~~QL _
individuals with the interests of their employing finn." The effectiveness of an organization's
control system is a function of (1) the degree of alignment in the direction of control and (2) the
human resource management policies and practices in place to suppon it (Oucm, 1979). Ouchi
- (1981) characterizes the overall control process as "people treannent", which consists of
selection/screening, training, behavior monitoring and output monitoring. Recently, in his
examination of the supervisor/subordinate relationship, Snell (1992) identified and studied three
types of control systems: (1) input control, (2) behavior control, and (3) output control.
Through the extension of this reasoning, we propose that these three types of control
affect the Parent/Subsidiary relationship in that, to varying degrees, MNCs control their
subsidiaries' (1) HR inputs (by influencing selection and training/~alization practices), (2) HR
behaviors (through the level of bureaucratic and cultural control they do, or do not, impose), and
(3) HR outputs (bythe reward systems they permit or impose).
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Selection supports the basic control mechanism of monitoring and is basically a form of
input control that occurs prior to the monitoring of 9utput (Jaeger, 1983). Its purpose is to
screen job applicants and allow only those who are most likely to behave as desired into the
organization (Jaeger and Baliga, 1985). As proposed by Ouchi (1979), companies use selection
for the internalization and identification of employees. This practice is most common in the
"professional bureaucracies" such as hospitals, public accounting fIrms, and universities. .
Accordingly, some have suggested that a control mechanism designed to identify and select the
most appropriate people will generate high employee commitment as a result of internalized and
shared values (Ouchi, 1979; Schneider, 1987). Therefore, through the selection process, an
organization must find persons who have the technical skills required (or are trainable), will
accept the organization's authority, will learn the organization's rules and regulations, and will
perform satisfactorily.
In the context of an MNC, especially as more host-country nationals move into
managerial positions within·its subsidiary, several major strategic management and control issues
arise; such as the need to insure that local managers commit to world-wide, rather than just local,
business objectives (Kobrin, 1988). In addition, think: about a subsidiary that needs to hire
employees. Here, the parent company's representative, the expatriate, may develop and rely upon
a set of non-uniform personal criteria for hiring. Finally, the expatriate manager may choose to
administer some form of corporate culture or value assessment to insure that candidates' values
match those of the fum (Evans and Lorange, 1989). Therefore, a rigorous process for selecting
the expatriate managers that will guide the subsidiary may be useful as a control mechanism to
insure the global integration of human resource management strategies across the MNC.
IHR Strategy and IHR Control vav1smj.doc 2/28194 Page 11
Alternatively, some MNCs attempt to create flexible career paths for their management. For
instance, Doz and Van den Poel (1983) point out that the managing directors at Ciba Geigy
subsidiaries have a stronger say in the appointment of their subordinates than the central product
division has. Similarly, Martinez and Ricks (1989) found that U.S. parent companies involvement
in various stages of the selection process of managers in affiliates is greater when there is high
resource dependence on the parent company, and the opposite is true for affIliates with low
resource dependence. Low resource dependent affiliates often simply submit a selection decision
to the U.S. parent for approval after the affiliate's general manager renders a decision.
Considering this, we posit that a subsidiary with a higher level of HR localization will place iess .
emphasis on the selection input control. Alternatively, a subsidiary with more global HR
integration will have more emphasis on selection control. Therefore, we offer the following
hypotheses regarding the selection input control:
Hypothesis 2a: Subsidiaries pursuing a "receptive" HR strategy will score the highest on the
selection input control measure.
Hypothesis 2b: Subsidiaries pursuing an "autonomous"HR strategy will score the lowest on the
selection input control measure.
Training and Socialization
In cybernetic systems, the process of training and socialization is also considered by many
to be part of an organization's input control system (Snell. 1992). Indeed. Ouchi (1979) proposed
that most organizations can rely on selection and screening only to a limited extent, and after that,
they must rely on training to impart the desired skills and values. Among other things. training
provides organization members with the necessary skills. abilities and values to be functional in
the organization. Some have even asserted that the component of training which ultimately has
the greatest impact on control is socialization (Etzioni. 1961). Socialization is an interpersonal
process of informally or implicitly teaching organizational values and behavioral expectations to
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organizational members to equip them for successful participation within the organization (Jaeger
and Baliga, 1985).
Therefore, MNCs that rely on this type of input control emphasize a longitudinal process
of socialization as the primary vehicle for managerial training. ItS purpose is to ensure that future
managers thoroughly internalize the corporate culture and related information-processing rules
and norms before assuming managerial responsibilities in a subsidiary (Pucik and Katz, 1986). In
addition, many MNCs recognize that management development programs need to emphasize
worldwide information sharing on economic, sOCial, political, technological and market trends..
To facilitate this, some companies export home country training and development programs to
other countries for local employees, or they bring host-country nationals to corporate
headquarters to expose them to the corporate culture and enable them to develop a broader
perspective (Dowling and Schuler, 1990).
Furthermore, Stopford and Wells (1972) point out that one way of combating control
problems is the creation of a sense of cooperation, and shared values among organization
members around the world. They point out, however, that this requires heavy expenditures for
communication, including frequent meetings and retraining sessions. Jaeger (1983) also argues
that in a cultural control driven organization, personal contacts, such as visits and telephone calls,
serve as the most frequent and useful form of interaction between headquarters and the subsidiary.
Consequently, training and socialization facilitates the global integration of HR in MNCs.
Alternatively, there is recognition of local needs and the need to provide training,
development, and promotion opportunities for host-country nationals as well as parent-country
nationals in MNCs (Dowling and Schuler, 1990). So, training needs to be provided to local
managers to enable them to learn how the subsidiary operates and to develop the skills required to
fulfill their managerial roles. Even more, Baliga and Baker (1985) suggest that expatriates receive
training concentrated in the assigned region's culture, history, politics, economy, religion, social,
and business practices to adapt to the host country. Therefore, we hypothesize that training and
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socialization may be used for responding to both integration and localization of subsidiary's HRM.
Consequently,
Hypothesis 3a: Subsidiaries pursuing an "active" HR strategy will score the highest on the
training and socialization input control measure.
Hypothesis 3b: Subsidiaries pursuing an "autonomous" HR strategy will score the lowest on the
training and socialization input control measure.
Behavior Control
In the MNC/Subsidiary context, the two most powerful control mechanisms that emerge
from the literature on human res~:>urcemanagement control are bureaucratic and cultural control.
These forms of control influence how people- do their work, rather than who performs the work
or the rewards they receive for doing it (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977; Pucik and Katz, 1986;
Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). Bureaucratic control is manifest when a headquarters influences the
operations of a subsidiary primarily through a clearly defined set of rules and procedures.
Budgets, on-site inspections, and control of the management process facilitate the enforcement of
these ruies (Doz and Prahalad, 1984). Alternatively, the concept of cultural control is less explicit
and relies more on perpetuating common values and meanings than on explicit audits and
regulations required by a bureaucratic control mechanism (Pucik and Katz, 1986).
Bureaucratic
Bureaucratic control systems operate under norms of rationality and usually rely on a high
degree of formalization. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are the central elements of a
bureaucratic control system. SOPs, which often corne in the form of company manuals or rule
books, outline the behavioral repertoires that members of the organization are to adhere to
(Hickson, 1966). Child (1973) notes that bureaucratic control consists of the utilization of a
limited and explicit set of rules and regulations to define desired performance in terms of outputs
- and/or behaviors. Furthermore, based on the assumption of a centralized hierarchy, behavior
- control originates from the top down, frequently in the form of clearly articulated operating
procedures (Cheng and McKinley, 1983; Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 1990). Given this
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backdrop, Snell (1992) has defined bureaucratic behavior control to be centralization, articulated
procedures, close supervision, and behavior appraisal.
In the MNC setting, bureaucratic control exists when the headquaners of a subsidiary exens
its influence through a clearly defined set of rules and procedures. For example, Doz (1986) notes
that ffiM analyzes thineen general indicators, and countless micro measures, of subsidiary
performance each month. Moreover, centralization, fonnalization and standardization (written
policies, rules, job descriptions, standard procedures, manuals, and chans) are coordination
mechanisms used by MNCs for integrating activities that remain dispersed across subsidiaries
(Martinez and larillo, 1991). Consequently,-we can sunnise that bureaucratic behavior control of
subsidiaries provides an advantage for integrating human resource management across a MNC's
far flung subsidiaries;
. __ A~te~ativ.e!y~Cray(19?~) prop?~es that_~~~I1_s?~~icliari~s_ hav~ t!te~emptatio~_~o deviate_
from overall organizational policy or when the need for predictability is high (especially when the
subsidiary looks as it is in danger of being overtaken by local political, cultural, or economic
forces), MNCs are more likely to use bureaucratic control. Therefore, in the case that a
subsidiary has a predisposition toward localizing their HRM, some explicit control mechanisms
may be used to insure stability and predictability. Doz (1986) notes that Dow Chemical
developed a corporate Product Depanment for central management of five autonomous regional
companies, which allows managers from different units to cooperate in joint economic studies. In
the end, however, he assens that managing localization hinges on a paradox: intersubsidiary
coordination provides subsidiary managers with the means to improve their competitiveness over
purely national competitors, and yet it limits their freedom to be succ~ssful in their own particular
national environment (Doz, 1986). Hence, localization of subsidiaries' HRM will not make the
need for bureaucratic behavior control as great as the pressure for integration across the globe.
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Therefore,
Hypothesis 4a: Subsidiaries pursuing an "active" HR strategy will score the highest on the
bureaucratic behavior control measure.
Hypothesis 4b:Subsidiaries pursuing an "autonomous" HR strategy will score the lowest on the
bureaucratic behavior control measure.
Cultural
Some define culture, be it organizational or national, as a set of taken-for-granted
assumptions, expectations, or rules for being inthe world. In a circular manner, culture shapes
individual attitudes and it, in turn, is shaped by the actions, beliefs, and behaviors of individuals
(Adler and Jelinek, 1986). Ouchi and Jaeger (1978) liken cultural control in a Type Z
organization to "clan control." In organizations characterized by cultural control, control is more
implicit and informal rather than explicit and fOInlal (Jaeger and Baliga, 1985). In a pure cultural
--'~_::_=---:-con-ti61:sysiem;~-any::guidance IS ofan' aggregate rather than~specificnature, ai1d:inonitoring-in-this _.•... --- ...
type of system occurs mostly through interpersonal interactions. Essentially, all members of the
culture are familiar with it·and sh~ its expectations. It is relatively easy to observe performance.
and compliance with the culture through these interpersonal interactions. Feedback occurs on a
person-to-person basis and is often subtle in nature. Finally, some say that culture serves as a
very rich and broad guide to behavior, so that an individual and the persons around him will
always have an implicit sense of his performance in the context of that culture (Baliga and Jaeger,
1984).
InMNCs, headquarters may place trustworthy expatriates in upper and middle.
management positions of subsidiaries, socialize new employees into the firm's culture, de-
emphasize formalization, and allow greater local discretion (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977). In
addition, a MNC may assign parent company managers to the key management positions of a
foreign subsidiary. These actions are consistent with the concept of cultural control, because
parent company managers within a foreign subsidiary are likely to be monitoring and evaluating
the activities and behaviors within the subsidiary (Egelhoff, 1984). Moreover, Jaeger (1983) also
" "
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indicates that one would expect an initial heavy use of expatriates in subsidiaries for MNCs to
.establish and maintain their organizational culture in the overseas location. All to say, the use of
expatriates, an absence of explicit monitoring, and limited direct feedback all characterize a
reliance on cultural control. Taken together, these attributes allow for more decentralized
decision making.
A recent study found that Japanese MNCs rely heavily on cultural control (Jaeger and
Baliga, 1985). In addition, some suggest that Japanese fIrms in southeast Asia seem to be taking
more positive steps to "Japanize" than their· counterparts in the U.S: and in West Germany
(Ishida, 1986). Interestingly, Jaeger (1983) also found a so-called TypeZ organization, an
American company that has often been likened to the typical Japanese company, that relies heavily
on cultural control. On the other hand, Egelhoff (1984) found that to exencontrol, U.S. MNCs
generally rely on more precise plans and budgets to generate suitable standards for comparison
-..- ~.... - . _._- ..- . -- "---_ ..
(bureaucratic controls), whereas European MNCs lean more on cultural control.
The advantage of cultural control is that it allows for a greater degree of localization of
subsidiaries' HRM policies and practices. When an expatriate takes over a key position in a
subsidiary, he/she opens and widens the communication channels between headquarters and the
subsidiary which fosters greater local discretion and responsiveness (Edstrom and Galbraith,
1977; Pucik and Katz, 1986). Likewise, Doz (19~6) posits that the key role ofheadquaners
management in the nationally responsive MNC is to transfer cultural norms, organization beliefs,
and behavioral standards.
However, the level of cultural control raises another issue, namely, the cost of imparting
control (Jaeger, 1983). An overreliance on cultural control driven systems can drive the
organization toward a bureaucratic control system, because the explicit costs (such as greater use
of expatriates) associated with the headquarters-subsidiary relationship in· a cultural control
system tend to be greater than those ofa bureaucratic control system (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983;
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Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). Therefore, we hypothesize that subsidiaries that make heavy use of
bureaucratic behavior control will make less use of cultural behavior control. Accordingly,
Hypothesis 5a: Subsidiaries pursuing an "autonomous" HR Strategy score the highest on the
cultural behavior control measure. .
Hypothesis 5b: Subsidiaries pursuing a "receptive" HR Strategy score the lowest on the
cultural behavior control measure.
Output Control
Rewards
Think of the final phase in the control sequence as monitoring an input, process, or output,
comparing it to a standard, and providing selective rewards and adjustments accordingly (Ouchi,
1977). As an alternative to using input control or process (behavioral) control, organizations can
focus on output control (Ouchi, 1977). In the case of output control, there is no need to know
. ---- --_..•---_._-- . -"---' ._----~..._--_. _._-_ .. - -~_..- ---~._-- . -- ---. ---- .... -..'.' ~ ._-- --"--.'----_ .. "--..- _._-.. -_..._----~--- --.
the process itself in its entirety, but a reliable and valid measure of the desi.re(foutPuts-must ·iJe-
commonly accepted (Ouchi,1977; Hill and Hoskisson, 1987). In addition, to induce performance
that fulfills an organization's intentions, the reward system needs to link to outcomes (Kerr, 1985;
Snell, 1992).
In MNCs, it seems particularly important to match the corporation's strategic intent with
the goals, competencies, and motivations of key managers (Edstrom and Lorange, 1984). Indeed,
the undergirdings for reward systems in most MNCs are a host of readily apparent relationships
between performance and remuneration. When this is not the case, the decoupling of appraisal
and rewards may render output-based control systems ineffective (Pucik and Katz, 1986).
Furthermore, Pucik (l984) proposes that any reward system must strike a balance between equity
issues within the organization and the conditions of labor markets in countries from which
managers originate. Therefore, the features that facilitate output control in MNCs include: the
presence of measurable outcomes, the measurement of outcomes, and the presence of an
outcomes--consequences link.
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As the number of levels of hierarchy increase, horizontal differentiation makes it more
difficult to arrive at an equitable comparison of behavior. Even when this is the case, however, an
output control system will at least provide the appearance of yielding more readily comparable
units of performance (Ouchi, 1977). As such, there is little doubt that output control serves as an
important coordination mechanism for integrating separate subsidiaries of MNCs (Martinez and
Jarillo, 1989). For example, Doz (1986), notes that integrated MNCs often pay higher wages
than other companies in the same industry to build loyalty toward the company. Accordingly,
fueled by localized ~onetary incentives that are in synch with corporate objectives, output control
frequently blends the best of localization and globalization. Consequently,
Hypothesis 6: Subsidiaries pursuing an "active" HR Strategy will score the highest on the
rewards output control measure. .
r
Hypothesis 6: Subsidiaries pursuing an !'autonomous" HRStrategy will score the highest on the· _..
._-- . - - .._-- _._---- - --- . -_._ .._- --- _... -- ---------_._-- - _ ... ----------_._._----------------.-_..._- .__ ... - ~----_._--.._-------_ .. , _..•..._.._---_.- -_..._-_. ---'.,--_..,-- ._..,_.. _._---- .. ~- -_._---
rewards output control measure.
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS
Data
An empirical study of the relationships between subsidiaries' IHR strategies and their
parents' lliR control follows. A sample of 321 subsidiaries of foreign MNCs operating in Taiwan
was used. The companies surveyed and in the sample include the largest and most renowned
MNCs operating in Taiwan. Indeed, most of the entities in this sample appear on the "Top 1000
Manufacturing Companies" and "Top 300 Service Companies" lists for Taiwan in 1993. Others
were included because they are located in the main Industrial Export Area of Taiwan. A mail
questionnaire was sent to the CEO or HR executive of these companies. One hundred
subsidiaries returned the questionnaire for a response rate of 31 %. In the sample, there is a one-
to-one relationship between parent and subsidiary, no parent is represented by more than one
subsidiary. Summary statistics (see Table 3) suggest that the £inns included in the study present a
reasonably representative sample of the subsidiaries ofMNCs operating in Taiwan.
IHR Strategy and IHR COntrol oaplsmj,doc 2/28/94 Page 19
Note that for all of these subsidiaries the percentage of ownership by the parent company
was at least 50%, and in most cases this percentage was nearly 100%. A large majority of the
companies were in manufacturing industry, and nearly half had Japanese parents.
****************************
Put Table 3 here
****************************
Measures
Two sets ofvanabies were operationalizect in this study. The fIrst set consisted of
measures designed to capture the IHR strategies of these MNCs in Taiwan, and the second set
contained variables intended to measure the IHR control utilized by these fIrms.
The lliR strategy variables capture the degree of global integration and the degree of local
responsiveness being exhibited by MNC parent companies 'in Taiwan. Much the same as the
...._- _. - - ,--~
,- concepts'that other researchers have investigated and reported in the literature (Tichy, Fombrun
and Devanna, 1982; Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Bamberger and Philips, 1991), the dimensions in
this study include: organization culture, compensation and rewards, staffIng and appraisal, and
training and development. We designed and used a seven-point scale proposed by Prahalad and
Doz (1987) to capture the executives' strategy assessments. The items we developed measure the
strategic benefit of localization (customizing HR policies in accordance with the needs of the local
environment) and globalization (importing HR policies from the parent's headquarters).
SpecifIcally, the IHR control variables capture the use of the selection control, training and
socialization control, bureaucratic behavior control, cultural behavior control, and rewards
output control, which appear below:
1. Selection--input control:
parent's involvement in assessing potential of subsidiary managers.
parent's agreement with staffing of subsidiaries' managers.
parent's provision of selection procedures for subsidiaries' mangers.
/
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2. Training and Socia/ization--input control:
parent's visits to managers and technicians in the foreign group.
parent's commiunent to training managers.
parent's involvement in managers' skill development .~
amount of foreign training for subsidiaries' managers before assignment
3. Bureaucratic--behavior control:






de-emphasizing formal policies and procedures.
5. Rewards--output control:
development of results criteria.
presence of performance-reward link.
presence of localized monetary incentives.
---- . __ . -_.. _. ---- -- _. -- -_._- ---_._" -
----- ---The overall measures·ofcon-troland-thesetofitems we used were basedupoh fe-search by
Snell (1992), who has studied the concept of control in the supervisor--subordinate setting. We
refined and modified his measures to suit our level of analysis, the parent--subsidiary relationship.
To measure MNC parent--subsidiary lliR control, this study uses a 27-item, 7-point scale.
Methods
The first procedure was to identify the dimensions of lliR strategy and IHR control.
Factor analysis was employed to: explore these constructs, identify the tentative underlying
dimensions, and suggest items for deletion (Schwab, 1980). Like the preceding studies, the factor
analytic method used was principle components with varimax rotation.
The second step consisted of taking the IHR strategy dimensions discovered in step one
and classifying the sample finns along these dimensions. Doing so enables the fonnation of
subgroups of subsidiaries, those that follow similar HR strategies. Two firms were deemed to be
in the same strategic group if they displayed similar levels of IHR integration and localization,
regardless of the industry in which they compete. The objective here was to obtain a taxonomy of
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IHR strategies across industries with the two dimensions empirically measured (Martinez and
Jarillo, 1991) and compare it with the model typology of IHR strategy that appears in
Figure 4. As has been the case for previous studies of this construct, this step was performed
through a cluster analysis following the "k-means" algorithm (Hartigan 1975; Hartigan and Wong
1979).
The third stage consisted of exploring the differences in IHR controls across the IHR
strategic groups. By doing so, we were able to test the five hypotheses developed previously.
Means difference tests were used to analyze the relationships between IHR strategies and IHR
controls. ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) was the statistical technique used to accomplish this.
RESULTS .-
Summary Statistics: IHR Strategy and mR Control
Table 4 gives the means, standard deviations, coefficient alphas, interrater reliabilities, and
intercorrelations for all variables. The alphas indicate internal consistency. For the global
integration, the local responsiveness, and most of the control variables, the alphas were higher
than .80 level; which is good for basic research in that the proportion of error variance for a scale
with alpha = .80 is exactly the same for any test regardless of the number of items (Cortina,
1993). Although the alphas for the cultural control measure are somewhat low, just above the .60
level, they still meet Nunnally's (1967) criterion of a minimum of .50 for adequate reliability.
****************************
Put Table 4 here
****************************
Factor Analyses: IHR Strategy and mR Control
The IHR strategy and IHR control variables were factor-analyzed to determine their
underlying dimensions. In the first factor analysis, of IHR strategy, the strategy measures
generated two stable factors representing global integration and local responsiveness, each having
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an eigenvalue above 1.0 and together accounting for 68.30 percent of variance in the data. Table
5 provides the lliR strategy items and factor loadings.
The second factor analysis, of lliR control, produced five stable factors. Two input, two
behavioral and one output control factors emerged, each having an eigenvalue above 1.0 and
together accounting for 58.36 percent of variance in the data. Four items did not load on any of
the five factors and were deleted. Table 6 gives the lliR control items and their factors loadings.
****************************
Put Table 5 here
****************************
****************************
Put Table 6 here
****************************
Cluster Analysis: IHR Strategy
The 100 MNCs in the sample were classified according to their values on the IHR
strategic dimensions of int~grationand .localization. The results of the cluster analysis appear in
Table 7, where the two dimensions, lliR integration and localization, appear to be good
discriminators of strategic groups. Three clusters emerge, representing three specific strategic
groups. A good three-group clustering was observed, for the variance among the groups is larger
than variance within the groups.
Of these three groups (see Figure 5), we classified the first, composed of 33 fmns with
high integration and low localization, as adopting the "receptive" IHR strategy outlined
previously. The second group, made up of 36 firms with high integration and high localization,
appears to adhere to the "active" HR strategy outlined above. The third group, which contains
the remaining 31 firms with low integration and high localization, seems to follow an
"autonomous" HR strategy.
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****************************
Put Table 7 here
****************************
****************************
Put Figure 5 here
****************************
The Relationship Between fiR Strategy and fiR Control
After placing the subsidiaries in the llIR strategic framework of Figure 4, we examine the
hypotheses pertaining to the relationships between IHR strategy and IHR control. Table 8 shows
the means and standard deviations for selection, training and socialization, bureaucratic, cultural,
and reward control by group, the differences between the mean values across groups, and the
selection control with the highest intensity among the three groups. Additionally, the fIrms in
Group 2 (the actives) employ the greatest amount of training and socialization, bureaucratic, and
reward control among the three strategic groups. Finally, while the fIrms in Group 3 (the
autonomizers) utilize the most cultural control~ they adopt the least of all the other types of
control, especially selection and bureaucratic control.
****************************
. Put Table 8 here
****************************
DISCUSSION
Recall that the aim of this analysis was to unite the precepts of the global integration--local
responsiveness framework from the Strategy literature (Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979; Porter,
1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1987) and Control Theory (Tannenbaum, 1968; Ouchi, 1979; 1981)
to defIne and empirically examine the concepts of International Human Resource Strategy and
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International Human Resource Control. We set out to test the relationship between ll-IR strategy
and IHR control by smdying the parent companies of MNCs operating in Taiwan and their
subsidiaries. On the whole, the evidence from this analysis suggests that the global integration--
local responsiveness framework provides a useful taxonomy for IHR strategy identification.
Likewise, Snell's (1992) operationalization of Control Theory seems to serve as an appropriate
theoretical backdrop for smdyingll-lR control at the finn level. Combining these two theoretical
perspectives provides us with a means to analyze.the relationship between ll-IR strategy and llIR
control. A summary of the hypotheses and the conclusions we were able to draw from this study
may be found in Table 9 below.
****************************
Put Table 9 here
****************************
Regarding the role of the parent in the acquisition of managers and employees to staff the
subsidiary we observe that strategic Groups 1 (receptive) and 2 (active) place more of an
emphasis on the use of selection control than Group 3 (autonomous). Therefore, the data
partially support Hypothesis 2. Since the difference between Groups 1 and 2 is not significant,
however, the support is not unequivocal. These results suggest that if a MNC and its subsidiary
emphasize a high degree of global integration and low localization, there will be a greater reliance
on controlling the selection process. For example, the parent will rigorously select the subsidiary's
managers, picking those who demonstrate high commitment to the company and those who
identify with its world-wide objectives. Alternatively, in a subsidiary that has low integration and
high localization, executives within the subsidiary are likely to exert stronger influence on the
appointment of their subordinates.
So far as the role of the parent in shaping the behaviors and outputs of employees after they
have joined the subsidiary, note that the data confirm that strategic Group 2 (the actives) makes
the heaviest use of training and socialization control, bureaucratic behavior control, and reward
output control. Therefore, Hypotheses 3,4, and 5 are at least partially confIrmed. These results
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verify that organizations employing a high degree of global integration and a high degree of local
responsiveness will: utilize relatively more training and socialization input controls to formally
impart requisite skills and desired values; rely heavily on bureaucratic control to formally and
carefully monitor behaviors and processes; and make use of more reward output control to assure
the desired outcomes.
Although strategic Group 3 makes a more extensive use of cultural behavior control than
the other two groups, the difference between it and the other two groups is not statistically
significant; thus there is no support for Hypothesis 5. When we look at the variOUS· types of
control within Group 3 (autonomous), cultural behavior control is less imPortant than training
control, bureaucratic behavior control, and output control. There are several possible
explanations for this.
On one hand, adopting an autonomous IHR strategy to respond to local needs may create
some difficulties when expatriates are brought in. Indeed, some suggest that the rising ambitions
and aspirations of local employees make it necessary to award an increased share of managerial
positions in subsidiaries to local nationals (Pucik, 1984). In this case, training and socialization of
local managers can be used instead of bringing in more expatriates (Jaeger, 1983; Pucik and Katz,
1986). Pucik (1984) notes that in order to respond to local pressures, it is only natural that
MNCs begin to emphasize the promotion and development of local resident managers, with
expatriates shrinking in number and influence.
On the other hand, due to the high cost of expatriates, the very prospect of creating and
maintaining a cultural control system (where expatriates are shaped to the culture) can drive the
organization more towards a bureaucratic control system (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983). In addition,
based on the proliferation of local-market driven monetary incentives, output control may address
local needs, especially those pertaining to compensation and rewards management When this is
the case, the relationship between cultural behavior control and HR localization is more
complicated than was originally hypothesized. It seems that more localization does not
necessarily result in more cultural behavior control. This may be why an "active" HR strategy
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group, a group that pursues high HR localization, relies on the least amount of cultural behavior
control.
In sum, when we look at the various types of control, it seems that training and
socialization control is used more than selection control to influence a s'ubsidiary's inputs. It also
appears that bureaucratic behavior control is relied upon more than cultural behavior control to
impact a subsidiary's processes. This is not too surprising, given Ouchi's (1979) assertion that
most organizations can rely on selection and screening only to a limited extent; and they can select
partially for the skills and values desired, but they will not be able to find people who fit exactly
their needs. Therefore, the organization must rely on training and socialization. In MNCs, the
reliance on local management is increasing.' In that subsidiaries, when compared to their
headquarters, know their job candidates and incumbents well, MNCs seems apt to get more
involved with training and socialization, rather than selection, to control their subsidiaries' inputs.
... - .. ~ - _ .. ~. -- ----...- ..--_._. - -- - _.~- -- --- ---- --- .._- -- - ---.
Additionally, the literature suggests that the explicit costs (such as greater use of
expatriates) associated with the headquarters--subsidiary relationship in cultural control
dominated systems tend to be greater than those for bureaucratic control systems (Wilkins and
Ouchi, 1983; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). Accordingly,MNCs tend to use more bureaucratic
control than cultural control to influence the subsidiary's HR processes.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FuTuRE RESEARCH
In this study a Global Integration--Local Responsiveness framework for studying the IHR
strategies of MNCs and their subsidiaries was proposed, developed, and tested to investigate the
relationship between IHR strategy and HRM control. The main conclusion from this study is that
there seems to be a strong relationship between the IHR strategy a MNC adopts with regard to its
subsidiary and the type and intensity of IHR control that defines the relationship between these
two entities.
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We observe that MNCs and their subsidiaries adopt one of three different lliR strategies,
they are "receptive", "active", or "autonomous". Subsidiaries pursuing "receptive" HR strategies
depend more upon a rigorous selection process for employees than the other lliR strategy
groups. Alternatively, subsidiaries pursuing "active" lliR strategies use more training and
socialization, bureaucratic, and reward controls thali other two lliR strategy groups. Finally,
subsidiaries pursuing "autonomous" HR strategies used more cultural control than the other lliR
strategy groups did, although the differences were not statistically significant. However, for the
"autonomous" HR strategy group, cultural behavior control was overwhelmed by training and
socialization input control, bureaucratic behavior control, and rewards output control.
As proposed by Doz and Prahalad (1986), MNCs' approaches to strategic control need to
be sensitive to both local responsive demands and global integration opportunities. Our findings
seem to suggest that the global integration of a MNC and its subsidiary's lliR requires the use of
.. _. . --.- ..._-- -- -_. -_. - .. _- -- ...----
rigorous selection and training and socialization to control IHR inputs; the use of bureaucratic
controls for influencing IHR activities; and the use of results and rewards controls for their IHR
output. Alternatively, the localization of a MNC and its subsidiary's lliR will require the use of
training and socialization to control HR inputs, the use of bureaucratic and cultural controls to
impact IHR processes, and the use of results and rewards control to affect HR outputs. However,
we found that MNCs tend to use more training and socialization to control their subsidiaries' HR
inputs, rather than utilize selection control. Additionally, they use more bureaucratic controls to
direct their subsidiaries' HR processes, rather than use cultural controls, which are often more
costly.
All to say, the field of HR control has advanced in the last decade, but most of the
developments have been conceptual,especially on the "formulation" side of strategy, addressing
issues such as, how to deploy HR controls to align international strategy needs. As has frequently
happened in international human resource management, however, these developments have had
very little to say on how to tie HR control and HR strategy together. Therefore, this study's
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findings should prove to be useful to international human resource practitioners and researchers
interested in strategic international human resource management
Some limitations related to this study constrain the interpretation of its findings, but they do
suggest avenues for future research. First, as noted, the participants in this study were the
subsidiaries' CEO or Senior HR executives who provided perceptual data, as opposed to a survey
of parent company respondents or numerous subsidiary managers to tap the parent company's
perceptions about its strategy or the actual policies and practices in place within the subsidiary.
Future research might investigate directly from the standpoint of headquarters how MNCs'
headquarters manage their subsidiaries' IHR and how they respond to pressures for integration
and localization.
Second, future research might try to refme the constructs and the operational definition of
subsicliarie~'human resource man.~~e~~~t c?ntr<?lthat ~as developed here~ In this study, f()r
example, we did not include items related to local acculturation of subsidiaries' expatriates--an
important element of a subsidiary's HRM. In addition, the decentralization in cultural behavior
control of this study needs to be more clearly defined to distinguish it from the decentralization in
output control that Snell (1992) refers to. Martinez and Ricks (1989) have posited that MNCs
have different influences on affiliates' individual HRM decisions. Therefore, there is a need to see
what kind of lliR decentralization is related to cultural behavior control and output control.
Funher research that focuses on IHR decentralization would be especially valuable.
Finally, the construct domain for output control also remains somewhat murky. Further
research might investigate whether explicit performance reporting systems are best conceived as a
fonn of output control, as Jaeger and Baliga (1985) suggest, or as a type of bureaucratic behavior
control as Snell (1992) argues. Snell (1992) states that researchers have developed many
different frameworks to describe both of these controls. This study adopted the approach where
controlling processes are thought of as throughput controls; thus, the subsidiary's frequent reports
to headquarters were viewed as a method for MNCs to control the information exchanges with
the subsidiary. However, further research is needed to differentiate the construct.
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Despite these limitations, it is believed that the results of the analysis make a contribution to
our understanding of the relationship between subsidiaries' IHR strategies and the IHR controls
used to implement them within a multinational corporation.
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_and approval of headquarters.
2. Training and Socialization
headquarters provides.
and headquarters visits subsidiary to oversee.
3. Bmeaucratic:









-- --------------- -- ---------------- --- ------- - - - - - ---- -----------useof objective and results-based criteria.,
----- -------------- ---- ----- ------ -------- -------- ----- ··------presence-ofpeiformancc-.:-riwardSlmk: -. ---
and use of monetary incentives.









Parent's Ownership 50% -60% 15
60% -70% 7
70% - 80% 3
80% - 90% 3
90% - 100% 72
Emplovees under 100 31
100 - 500 40
500 -1000 14
1000 - 2000 10
over 2000 5
-- ..Industii'-T-vpe--::,- -.- .- -- Manufacturing - - ---- -=:::_. -79=--':'~-:'~~- ::.--_ .._._- _... -- - - --
Service 21
n=100




~ Mu.D. s.d. Jl 1 Z 1 j S , 1
fUR Strategy
1. Global 24.05 7.55 .91
Integration




3. Selection 10.14 3.97 .79 .43 -.02
4. Training 19.01 5.34 .83 .40 .19 .44
and Socialization
BeMllioml
5. Bureaucratic 28.07 6.45 .81 .26 .16 .43 .29
6. Culwral" 21.88 5.93 .63 -.10 -.09 " -.24 -.21 -.32
Oulput
7. Rewards 33.23 6.88 .82 .28 .16 .21 .32 .26 .10
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Promotion and Career System -0.04 0.85
Staffmg Policy -0.03 0.85
Appraisal Program 0.12 0.83
-~--~Ttamihg-P-rogram:..-::----:=----:::~~::..-~:-..::=--------:-----=::.--~:-:.:.:-: ----:.:.:------------------::.:----- --- --0.02 _:-- ---- -:-0.82_ -----.:----------~-::-::-=_-:_:: ~= : ::. __:_~ : _
Corporate Culture 0.05 0.81
Compensation Policy -0.15 0.74
Eigenvalue











Factor Analysis: Subsidiaries' IHR Control
Questionnaire Items 1 I J ~ ..s.
REWARD··OUTPUT CONTROL
Performance Appraisal Is based on reaching goals .83 .02 -.02 -J11 .01
DllrerellClCS In managers' pay represent performance .so .10 -.13 .16 -.10
Performance Is JUdged by results .75 .18 -.16 .27 .12
Managers' rewards are linked to concrete results .70 .01 .22 -.01 .15
Those who do not reach objectives receive a low rating .66 -.12 .20 -.14 -.18
The Incentives employee receive are linked to subsidiary's profit .62 -.21 -.08 .52 .01
Motivating managers by higher base salary than competitors .36 -.00 .31 .12 .26
Motivating managers by higher base salary than competitors .36 -.00 .31 .12 .26
Performance Is Judged by results .80 .10 -.13 .16 -.10
BEHAVIORAL·· BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL
Target are written by parent .05 .81 .17 -.33 -.02
Performance programs are imposed by parent -.11 .71 .03 .09 .08
Receive frequent performance feedback from parent .09 .71 ~.04 -.02 -.16
Report frequent performance information to parent .01 .71 -.15 .15 -.11
Ac:c:ount for detail actions to parent .13 .69 -.09 -.01 -.01
Primary weight In evaluation is placed on managers' behavior -.01 .46 .18 .11 .02
INpUT··TRAINING AND SOCJALl7.ATION CONTROL
Frequent visiting of managers and technicians to the foreign group -.OS -.OS .83 .15 .02
Involvement In managers' skill deVelopment .07 -.12 .81 -.08 -.01
-.. Substantial foreigntra!Ding for high·level managers --.03 -.05 -.69 .- --.32 .00--
------PareliiiiciiDiiiiitDieiiftOfraiiiirig"the-riWiager---- -- -- --- - - .---.----- ----.06 -.25 -- -.65 -- '-~17 ----:.16
lNPUT·..sELECTION CONTROL
Series of parents' evaluations for second level managers before staffing .06 .06 .19 .81 .01
Parents' agreement with staffing of second level managers -.OS .01 .10 .79 -.14
Parent provide staffing procedures for managers .24 .08 .10 .52 .05
BEHAVIORAL·· CULTURAL CONTROL
Subsidiaries don't need to consult with HQ in setting standards .14 -.IS .r11 -.09 .69
Parents don't concern with proc:edures and methods .12 -.17 -.IS -.04 .67
Proportions of hlgh·level managers expatriated from the group -.35 .28 .04 .33 .59
Subsidiary's performance evaluations place primary .15 .25 -.16 -.47 .55
Numeric:al results are used as the cbief index of effectiveness -.23 -.15 -.16 .11 .44
Subsidiaries don't need to consult with HQ for setting performance goal .09 -.35 .19 -.13 .43
EIGENVALUE 5.93 3.70 2.35 1.86 1.34
PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED 22.81 14.21 ' 9.03 . 7.16 5.15.
TOTAL VARtANCEExpLAINED 22.81 37.02 46.05 53.21 58.36
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Table 8
The Relationship Between lliR Strategy and lliR Control




IHR Strategy ms:l!n 1Jl. ms:l!n J.d. ms:l!n 1Jl. ms:l!D. J.d. ms:l!n J.l!.
~












Dirrerences Between Means fQr fiR ContrQI Across fiR Strategy Clusters
Ousters Selection Training and Bureaucratic Culwral Rewards
Socialization
Group 1 -- Group 2 0.48 -2.38 -1.58 0.85 -3.54
receptive--active
Group 2--Group 3 3.11 ** 4.52 ** 5.62** -1.75 5.35*
act;ve--auJonomDUS
Group I-Group 3 3.59 ** 2.14 4.05 * -.090 LSI
receptive--auJonomDUS
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Table 9
Summary of Hypotheses and Findings
Hypothesis 1:
IHR strategiu ofMNCs' subsidiaries will be segmented by subgroups
according to degrees ofintegration and localization. These subgroups
will resembk Jarillo and Martinez's three types: receptive strategy.
active strategy. and autonomous strategy.
Hypothesis 2:
Subsidiaries pursuing a "receptive" HR strategy will score the highest
and Subsidiaries pursuing an "autonomous" HR strategy will score
the lowest on input selection control.
Hypothesis 3:
Subsidiaries pursuing an "active" HR strategy will score the highest
and subsidiaries pursuing an "autonomous" HR strategy will score
lowest on input tmininr anti socialization control.
Hypothesis 4:
Subsidiaries pursuing an "active" HR strategy will score the highest
and Subsidiaries pursuing an "autonomous" HR strategy will score
the lowest on behavioral bureaucratic control.
Hyp~othesis~5:_=~_=_::~-=~:::~-'-:': -_-.-:. _
Subsidiaries pursuing an "autonomous" HR Strategy will score the highest
and Subsidiaries pursuing an "receptive" HR strategy will score
the lowest on behavioral~ control.
Hypothesis 6:
Subsidiaries pursuing an "active" HR Strategy will score the highest
and Subsidiaries pursuing an "autonomous" HR strategy will score
the lowest on output lD1!JllJi control.
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Supported
Partial Support
Partial Support
Partial Support
Not Supported
Partial Support
